New York v. Quarles
No. 82-1213
Argued January 18, 1984
Decided June 12, 1984
467 U.S. 649
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Syllabus
Respondent was charged in a New York state court with criminal
possession of a weapon. The record showed that a woman approached
two police officers who were on road patrol, told them that she had just
been raped, described her assailant, and told them that the man had just
entered a nearby supermarket and was carrying a gun. While one of the
officers radioed for assistance, the other (Officer Kraft) entered the store
and spotted respondent, who matched the description given by the woman.
Respondent ran toward the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft pursued him
with a drawn gun, but lost sight of him for several seconds. Upon
regaining sight of respondent, Officer Kraft ordered him to stop and put
his hands over his head; frisked him and discovered that he was wearing
an empty shoulder holster; and, after handcuffing him, asked him where
the gun was. Respondent nodded toward some empty cartons and
responded that "the gun is over there." Officer Kraft then retrieved the gun
from one of the cartons, formally arrested respondent, and read him his
rights under GO>Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. Respondent
indicated that he would answer questions without an attorney being
present and admitted that he owned the gun and had purchased it in
Florida. The trial court excluded respondent's initial statement and the gun
because the respondent had not yet been given the Miranda warnings, and
also excluded respondent's other statements as evidence tainted by the
Miranda violation. Both the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the exclusion of
respondent's initial statement and the gun because of Officer Kraft's failure
to read respondent his Miranda rights before attempting to locate the
weapon. Accordingly, it also erred in affirming the exclusion of
respondent's subsequent statements as illegal fruits of the Miranda
violation. This case presents a situation where concern for public safety
must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic
rules enunciated in Miranda. Pp. GO>653-660.
(a) Although respondent was in police custody when he made his
statements and the facts come within the ambit of Miranda, nevertheless,
on these facts, there is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that
Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted
[467 U.S. 650] into evidence, and the availability of that exception does not
depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. The
doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda do not require that it be applied in all
its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably
prompted by a concern for the public safety. In this case, so long as the
gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, it posed more than one
danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, or a
customer or employee might later come upon it. Pp. GO>655-657.
(b) Procedural safeguards that deter a suspect from responding, and
increase the possibility of fewer convictions, were deemed acceptable in
Miranda in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination. However, if Miranda warnings had
deterred responses to Officer Kraft's question about the whereabouts of the
gun, the cost would have been something more than merely the failure to
obtain evidence useful in convicting respondent. An answer was needed
to insure that future danger to the public did not result from the
concealment of the gun in a public area. P. GO>657.
(c) The narrow exception to the Miranda rule recognized here will to
some degree lessen the desirable clarity of that rule. However, the
exception will not be difficult for police officers to apply, because, in each
case, it will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it. Police
officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions
necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and
questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.
Pp. GO>658-659.
58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined.
O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part, post, p. GO>660. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which BRENNAN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p.
GO>674. [467 U.S. 651]